Act-Based Conceptions of Propositional Content. Contemporary and Historical Perspectives

New York: Oxford University Press (2017)

Authors
Mark Textor
King's College London
Friederike Moltmann
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Abstract
Ever since Frege, propositions have played a central role in philosophy of language. Propositions are generally conceived as abstract objects that have truth conditions essentially and fulfill both the role of the meaning of sentences and of the objects or content of propositional attitudes. More recently, the abstract conception of propositions has given rise to serious dissatisfaction among a number of philosophers, who have instead proposed a conception of propositional content based on cognitive acts (Hanks, Moltmann, Soames). This approach is not entirely new, though, but has important precedents in early analytic philosophy and phenomenology. The aim of this volume is bring together some of the most important texts from the relevant historical literature and new contributions from contemporary proponents of act-based conceptions of propositional content.
Keywords propositions  propositional attitudes  intentionality  structured propositions  actions and products
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2017
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
Chapters BETA

References found in this work BETA

Propositional or Non-Propositional Attitudes?Sean Crawford - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 168 (1):179-210.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Self-Consciousness and Reductive Functionalism.Arvid Båve - 2017 - Philosophical Quarterly 67 (266):1-21.
The Analytic Tradition in Philosophy.Gary Ostertag - 2019 - Analysis 79 (3):560-571.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2013-09-08

Total views
330 ( #20,128 of 2,311,213 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
27 ( #28,679 of 2,311,213 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature