Abstract Objects and the Semantics of Natural Language

Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press (2013)
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Abstract

This book pursues the question of how and whether natural language allows for reference to abstract objects in a fully systematic way. By making full use of contemporary linguistic semantics, it presents a much greater range of linguistic generalizations than has previously been taken into consideration in philosophical discussions, and it argues for an ontological picture is very different from that generally taken for granted by philosophers and semanticists alike. Reference to abstract objects such as properties, numbers, propositions, and degrees is considerably more marginal than generally held.

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Friederike Moltmann
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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