It is natural for those with permissive attitudes toward abortion to suppose that, if they have examined all of the arguments they know against abortion and have concluded that they fail, their moral deliberations are at an end. Surprisingly, this is not the case, as I argue. This is because the mere risk that one of those arguments succeeds can generate a moral reason that counts against the act. If this is so, then liberals may be mistaken about the morality of abortion. However, conservatives who claim that considerations of risk rule out abortion in general are mistaken as well. Instead, riskbased considerations generate an important but not necessarily decisive reason to avoid abortion. The more general issue that emerges is how to accommodate fallibilism about practical judgment in our decision-making.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Abortion, Society, and the Law.David F. Walbert - 1973 - Cleveland [Ohio]Press of Case Western Reserve University.
Abortion, Metaphysics and Morality: A Review of Francis Beckwith's Defending Life: A Moral and Legal Case Against Abortion Choice. [REVIEW]N. Nobis - 2011 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 36 (3):261-273.
Abortion, Christianity, and Consistency.Richard Schoenig - 1998 - Philosophy in the Contemporary World 5 (1):32-37.
Creation and Abortion: A Study in Moral and Legal Philosophy.F. M. Kamm - 1992 - Oxford University Press.
Two Stalemates in the Philosophical Debate About Abortion and Why They Cannot Be Resolved Using Analogical Arguments.Chris Kaposy - 2012 - Bioethics 26 (2):84-92.
The Expression of Experience: Code's Critique of Gilligan's Abortion Study.Alice Pitt - 1991 - Journal of Moral Education 20 (2):177-190.
Animality and Agency: A Kantian Approach to Abortion.Lara Denis - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (1):117-37.
Added to index2010-12-24
Total downloads94 ( #53,251 of 2,154,170 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #397,226 of 2,154,170 )
How can I increase my downloads?