Philosophical Forum 40 (4):473-488 (2009)

Christopher Mole
University of British Columbia
This article examines one way in which a fiction can carry ontological commitments. The ontological commitments that the article examines arise in cases where there are norms governing discourse about items in a fiction that cannot be accounted for by reference to the contents of the sentences that constitute a canonical telling of that fiction. In such cases, a fiction may depend for its contents on the real-world properties of real-world items, and the fiction may, in that sense, be ontologically committed. Having outlined a way of gauging the ontological commitments of a fiction, the article concludes by illustrating the way in which these considerations can be put to work in assessing the prospects of using fictionalism as a tactic for understanding the metaphysics of modality without incurring a commitment to the real existence of merely possible worlds.
Keywords Fictionalism
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9191.2009.00340.x
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References found in this work BETA

Make-Believe and Fictional Reference.Frederick Kroon - 1994 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 52 (2):207-214.

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Citations of this work BETA

Reference in Fiction.Stacie Friend - 2019 - Disputatio 11 (54):179-206.

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