Metaphilosophy 45 (3):441-461 (2014)

Authors
Bernard Molyneux
University of California, Davis
Abstract
According to orthodox views of philosophical methodology, when philosophers appeal to intuitions, they treat them as evidence for their contents. Call this “descriptive evidentialism.” Descriptive evidentialism is assumed both by those who defend the epistemic status of intuitions and by those, including many experimental philosophers, who criticize it. This article shows, however, that the idea that philosophers treat intuitions as evidence struggles to account for the way philosophers treat intuitions in a variety of philosophical contexts. In particular, it cannot account for philosophers' treatment of a priori intuitions, for nonpropositional uses of intuition, and for philosophers' failure to use intuition to exclude the counterintuitive. The article concludes that alternatives to descriptive evidentialism (some of which are sketched) must be developed, and that much of the recent debate between traditionalists and skeptics from, for example, experimental philosophy is probably based on a false presupposition
Keywords the philosophy of philosophy  experimental philosophy  descriptive evidentialism  philosophical intuition  philosophical methodology  philosophical evidence  ethical intuitions  metaphilosophy  a priori
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DOI 10.1111/meta.12094
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References found in this work BETA

Fact, Fiction, and Forecast.Nelson Goodman - 1955 - Harvard University Press.
Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2003 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Intuition Deniers.Jennifer Nado - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (3):781-800.

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