Nominalizing quantifiers

Journal of Philosophical Logic 32 (5):445-481 (2003)
Authors
Friederike Moltmann
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Abstract
Quantified expressions in natural language generally are taken to act like quantifiers in logic, which either range over entities that need to satisfy or not satisfy the predicate in order for the sentence to be true or otherwise are substitutional quantifiers. I will argue that there is a philosophically rather important class of quantified expressions in English that act quite differently, a class that includes something, nothing, and several things. In addition to expressing quantification, such expressions act like nominalizations, introducing a new domain of objects that would not have been present in the semantic structure of the sentence otherwise. The entities those expressions introduce are of just the same sort as those that certain ordinary nominalizations refer to (such as John's wisdom or John's belief that S), namely they are tropes or entities related to tropes. Analysing certain quantifiers as nominalizing quantifiers will shed a new light on philosophical issues such as the status of properties and the nature of propositional attitudes
Keywords nominalism  nominalizations  ontology  properties  propositional attitudes  quantification  quantifiers in natural language  tropes
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Reprint years 2004
DOI 10.1023/A:1025649423579
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References found in this work BETA

Word and Object.W. V. Quine - 1960 - MIT Press.
A Theory of Human Action.Alvin I. Goldman - 1970 - Princeton University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Reference to Numbers in Natural Language.Friederike Moltmann - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (3):499 - 536.
Relative Truth and the First Person.Friederike Moltmann - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 150 (2):187-220..
Propositions, Attitudinal Objects, and the Distinction Between Actions and Products.Friederike Moltmann - 2013 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume on Propositions, Edited by G. Rattan and D. Hunter 43 (5-6):679-701.
Recent Work on Propositions.Peter Hanks - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (3):469-486.
Predication as Ascription.David Liebesman - 2015 - Mind 124 (494):517-569.

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