Synthese 135 (1):77 - 118 (2003)

Authors
Friederike Moltmann
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Abstract
The most common account of attitude reports is the relational analysis according towhich an attitude verb taking that-clause complements expresses a two-placerelation between agents and propositions and the that-clause acts as an expressionwhose function is to provide the propositional argument. I will argue that a closerexamination of a broader range of linguistic facts raises serious problems for thisanalysis and instead favours a Russellian `multiple relations analysis' (which hasgenerally been discarded because of its apparent obvious linguistic implausibility).The resulting account can be given independent philosophical motivations within anintentionalist view of truth and predication.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy   Epistemology   Logic   Metaphysics   Philosophy of Language
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Reprint years 2004
DOI 10.1023/A:1022945009188
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References found in this work BETA

Events as Property Exemplifications.Jaegwon Kim - 1976 - In M. Brand & D. Walton (eds.), Action Theory. D. Reidel. pp. 310-326.
The Basis of Reference.Stephen Schiffer - 1978 - Erkenntnis 13 (1):171--206.

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Citations of this work BETA

Reference to Numbers in Natural Language.Friederike Moltmann - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (3):499 - 536.
Hopes, Fears, and Other Grammatical Scarecrows.Jacob M. Nebel - 2019 - Philosophical Review 128 (1):63-105.
Relative Truth and the First Person.Friederike Moltmann - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 150 (2):187-220..

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