Propositional attitudes without propositions

Synthese 135 (1):77 - 118 (2003)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The most common account of attitude reports is the relational analysis according towhich an attitude verb taking that-clause complements expresses a two-placerelation between agents and propositions and the that-clause acts as an expressionwhose function is to provide the propositional argument. I will argue that a closerexamination of a broader range of linguistic facts raises serious problems for thisanalysis and instead favours a Russellian `multiple relations analysis' (which hasgenerally been discarded because of its apparent obvious linguistic implausibility).The resulting account can be given independent philosophical motivations within anintentionalist view of truth and predication.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 89,330

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Content and Theme in Attitude Ascriptions.Graeme Forbes - 2018 - In Alex Grzankowski and Michelle Montague & Alex and Michelle Montague Grzankowski (eds.), Non-propositional Intentionality. Oxford: OUP. pp. 114-133.
Attitudes Toward Quotation1.Barbara Abbott - 2011 - In Elke Brendel (ed.), Understanding Quotation. De Gruyter Mouton. pp. 7--35.
What do propositions measure in folk psychology?Peter Weatherall - 1996 - Philosophical Psychology 9 (3):365-80.
Propositional attitudes in fiction.John Zeimbekis - 2004 - British Journal of Aesthetics 44 (3):261-276.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
348 (#50,378)

6 months
13 (#115,649)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Friederike Moltmann
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

Citations of this work

Higher‐order metaphysics.Lukas Skiba - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (10):1-11.
Hopes, Fears, and Other Grammatical Scarecrows.Jacob M. Nebel - 2019 - Philosophical Review 128 (1):63-105.
Reference to numbers in natural language.Friederike Moltmann - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (3):499 - 536.
Relative Truth and the First Person.Friederike Moltmann - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 150 (2):187-220..
Propositions on the cheap.Alex Grzankowski & Ray Buchanan - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (12):3159-3178.

View all 81 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Knowledge and belief.Jaakko Hintikka - 1962 - Ithaca, N.Y.,: Cornell University Press.
Word and Object.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1960 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 17 (2):278-279.
The Problems of Philosophy.Bertrand Russell - 1912 - Portland, OR: Home University Library.
Attitudes de dicto and de se.David Lewis - 1979 - Philosophical Review 88 (4):513-543.

View all 36 references / Add more references