Philosophical Studies 135 (2):255 - 277 (2007)

Authors
Bernard Molyneux
University of California, Davis
Abstract
Williamson (2000) [Knowledge and its Limits, Oxford: Oxford University Press] argues that attempts to substitute narrow mental states or narrow/environmental composites for broad and factive mental states will result in poorer explanations of behavior. I resist Williamson
Keywords broad mental  explanation  externalism  generality  internalism  knowledge  narrow mental  prime  primeness  williamson
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-005-2330-5
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References found in this work BETA

The Language of Thought.Jerry A. Fodor - 1975 - Harvard University Press.
The Meaning of 'Meaning'.Hillary Putnam - 1975 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7:131-193.
Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge.Alvin Goldman - 1976 - Journal of Philosophy 73 (November):771-791.
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.

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Citations of this work BETA

Belief is Prior to Knowledge.David Rose - 2015 - Episteme 12 (3):385-399.
Extended Minds and Prime Mental Conditions: Probing the Parallels.Zoe Drayson - 2018 - In Joseph Adam Carter, Andy Clark, Jesper Kallestrup, Spyridon Orestis Palermos & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Extended Epistemology. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 147-161.
Perceiving as Knowing in the Predictive Mind.Daniel Munro - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (4):1177-1203.

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