Primeness, internalism and explanatory generality

Philosophical Studies 135 (2):255 - 277 (2007)
Abstract
Williamson (2000) [Knowledge and its Limits, Oxford: Oxford University Press] argues that attempts to substitute narrow mental states or narrow/environmental composites for broad and factive mental states will result in poorer explanations of behavior. I resist Williamson
Keywords broad mental  explanation  externalism  generality  internalism  knowledge  narrow mental  prime  primeness  williamson
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-005-2330-5
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The Language of Thought.Jerry A. Fodor - 1975 - Harvard University Press.
The Meaning of 'Meaning'.Hilary Putnam - 1975 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7:131-193.
Knowing One's Own Mind.Donald Davidson - 1987 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 60 (3):441-458.
Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge.Alvin Goldman - 1976 - Journal of Philosophy 73 (November):771-791.

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