Quantification with Intentional and with Intensional Verbs

In Alessandro Torza (ed.), Quantifiers, Quantifiers, and Quantifiers. Springer (2015)
Friederike Moltmann
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
The question whether natural language permits quantification over intentional objects as the ‘nonexistent’ objects of thought is the topic of a major philosophical controversy, as is the status of intentional objects as such. This paper will argue that natural language does reflect a particular notion of intentional object and in particular that certain types of natural language constructions (generally disregarded in the philosophical literature) cannot be analysed without positing intentional objects. At the same time, those intentional objects do not come for free; rather they are strictly dependent on intentional acts that generally need to have a presence, in one way or another, in the semantic structure of the sentence.
Keywords nonexistent objects  quantification  transitive intensional verbs  intentional objects  intensional transitive verbs
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