Two kinds of first-person-oriented content

Synthese 184 (2):157 - 177 (2012)
Friederike Moltmann
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
In this paper, I will argue that two kinds of first-person-oriented content are distinguished in more ways than usually thought and I propose an account that will shed new light on the distinction. The first kind consists of contents of attitudes de se (in a broad sense); the second kind consists of contents that give rise to intuitions of relative truth. I will present new data concerning the two kinds of first-person-oriented content, together with a novel account of propositional content in general, namely based on the notion of an attitudinal object. That notion solves two major problems with Lewis's account of contents of attitudes de se and clarifies the difference between contents of attitudes de se and contents that give rise to intuitions of relative truth. I will propose an analysis of contents of the second kind in terms of what I call firstperson-based genericity, a form of genericity most explicitly expressed by sentences with generic one. I show how the overall account explains the particular semantic properties of sentences giving rise to intuitions of relative truth that distinguish them from sentences with expressions interpreted de se. I will start by introducing Lewis's account of attitudes de se and the problems that go along with that account. Introducing the notion of an attitudinal object, I will extend the account by an account of the truth conditions of the content of attitudes de se. I then discuss the second kind of first-person-oriented content, which is associated with intuitions of relative truth, and give an account of such contents on the basis of an analysis of generic one. Again making use of attitudinal objects, I will make clear what exactly distinguishes those contents from first-person-oriented contents of the first sort.
Keywords de se  predicates of taste  first person  relative truth
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11229-010-9730-6
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 35,954
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Relativism and Disagreement.John MacFarlane - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 132 (1):17-31.
The Nature and Structure of Content.Jeffrey C. King - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
Folk Psychology as Simulation.Robert M. Gordon - 1986 - Mind and Language 1 (2):158-71.
Making Sense of Relative Truth.John MacFarlane - 2005 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (3):321–339.

View all 19 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Relativism, Disagreement and Testimony.Alexander Dinges - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (S1):497-519.
The Syntax of Personal Taste.John Collins - 2013 - Philosophical Perspectives 27 (1):51-103.
Vagueness in Context.Stewart Shapiro - 2006 - Oxford University Press UK.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles


Added to PP index

Total downloads
118 ( #53,080 of 2,293,899 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
4 ( #139,386 of 2,293,899 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature