Synthese (Suppl 2):1-28 (2018)

Authors
Friederike Moltmann
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Abstract
This paper argues that truth predicates in natural language and their variants, predicates of correctness, satisfaction and validity, do not apply to propositions (not even with 'that'-clauses), but rather to a range of attitudinal and modal objects. As such natural language reflects a notion of truth that is primarily a normative notion of correctness constitutive of representational objects. The paper moreover argues that 'true' is part of a larger class of satisfaction predicates whose semantic differences are best accounted for in terms of a truthmaker theory along the lines of Fine's recent truthmaker semantics.
Keywords truth  correctness  propositions  attitudinal objects  modal objects  truthmaker semantics  that-clauses
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2018
ISBN(s)
DOI 10.1007/s11229-018-1814-8
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Aboutness.Stephen Yablo - 2014 - Princeton University Press.
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.
Conceptions of Truth.Wolfgang Künne - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
Truth-Makers.Kevin Mulligan, Peter Simons & Barry Smith - 1984 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 44 (3):287-321.

View all 35 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Outline of an Object-Based Truthmaker Semantics for Modals and Propositional Attitudes.Friederike Moltmann - forthcoming - In Dirk Kindermann, Peter Van Elswyk & Andy Egan (eds.), Unstructured Content. Oxford University Press.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2018-04-22

Total views
270 ( #30,939 of 2,411,478 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
54 ( #13,877 of 2,411,478 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes