SATS 18 (2):125-139 (2017)

Authors
Andrei Moldovan
Universidad de Salamanca
Abstract
Arguments against the Russellian theory of definite descriptions based on cases that involve failures of uniqueness are a recurrent theme in the relevant literature. In this paper, I discuss a number of such arguments, from Strawson (1950), Ramachandran (1993) and Szabo (2005). I argue that the Russellian has resources to account for these data by deploying a variety of mechanisms of quantifier domain restrictions. Finally, I present a case that is more problematic for the Russellian. While the previous cases all involve referential uses of descriptions (or some variations of such uses), the most effective objection to the uniqueness condition draws on genuine attributive uses.
Keywords Russell  Strawson  definite descriptions  incompleteness  uniqueness
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1515/sats-2016-0004
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Upload history
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Literal Meaning.François Recanati - 2002 - Cambridge University Press.
Linguistics in Philosophy.Zeno Vendler - 2019 - Cornell University Press.
Situations and Attitudes.Jon Barwise & John Perry - 1981 - Journal of Philosophy 78 (11):668-691.

View all 64 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

On the Russellian Reformation.Francesco Pupa - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 147 (2):247-271.
What Russell Couldn't Describe.Fredrik Haraldsen - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (3):459-473.
Denoting Phrases and Definite Descriptions.James W. Austin - 1976 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 14 (4):393-399.
A Reply to Szabó’s “Descriptions and Uniqueness”.Barbara Abbott - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 113 (3):223 - 231.
The Loss of Uniqueness.Z. Gendler Szabo - 2005 - Mind 114 (456):1185-1222.
The Loss of Uniqueness.Szabó Zoltán Gendler - 2005 - Mind 114 (456):1185 - 1222.
The Loss of Uniqueness.ZoltÁ Gendler SzabÓ - 2005 - Mind 114 (456):1185-1222.
A More General Theory of Definite Descriptions.Richard Sharvy - 1980 - Philosophical Review 89 (4):607-624.
Issues in the Semantics and Pragmatics of Definite Descriptions in English.Barbara Abbott - 2008 - In Nancy Hedberg & Jeanette Gundel (eds.), Reference: Interdisciplinary Perspectives. Oxford University Press. pp. 61-72.
Reference and Definite Descriptions.Keith S. Donnellan - 1966 - Philosophical Review 75 (3):281-304.
The Uniqueness Thesis.Matthew Kopec & Michael G. Titelbaum - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (4):189-200.
Reference and Descriptions.William Kim Blackburn - 1986 - Dissertation, University of Toronto (Canada)

Analytics

Added to PP index
2017-12-07

Total views
88 ( #104,699 of 2,330,358 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
12 ( #48,511 of 2,330,358 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes