Noûs 43 (1):116-136 (2009)

Authors
Bernard Molyneux
University of California, Davis
Abstract
The transparency argument concludes that we're directly aware of external properties and not directly aware of the properties of experience. Focusing on the presentation used by Michael Tye (2002) I contend that the argument requires experience to have content that it cannot plausibly have. I attribute the failure to a faulty account of the transparency phenomenon and conclude by suggesting an alternative understanding that is independently plausible, is not an error-theory and yet renders the transparency of experience compatible with mental-paint style views.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0068.2008.01698.x
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References found in this work BETA

The Intrinsic Quality of Experience.Gilbert Harman - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:31-52.
The Transparency of Experience.Michael G. F. Martin - 2002 - Mind and Language 17 (4):376-425.
Consciousness, Color, and Content.Michael Tye - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 113 (3):233-235.

View all 16 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Are Color Experiences Representational?Todd Ganson - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (1):1-20.
Stained Glass as a Model for Consciousness.Mihnea D. I. Capraru - 2015 - Philosophical Explorations 18 (1):90-103.

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