why the neural correlates of consciousness cannot be found

Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (9-10):168-188 (2010)
Authors
Bernard Molyneux
University of California, Davis
Abstract
From the assumption that the presence of consciousness is detectable, in the first instance, only from behavioral indicators, I offer a proof to the effect that, with respect to any theory T that states that some particular state or process is the neural correlate of consciousness, there are always rival neural correlates that, from T’s perspective, can never be empirically ruled out. That's because, with respect to these states, the means of detecting consciousness is disrupted along with the empirical test. Possible responses are discussed.
Keywords ncc  neural correlates  consciousness
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