Analysis 65 (3):233-237 (2005)
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| Abstract | This article has no associated abstract. (fix it) |
| Keywords | Evidence Metaphysics Physicalism Physiology Gillett, Carl Papineau, David Spurrett, David Witmer, Gene |
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| DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-8284.2005.00556.x |
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References found in this work BETA
A "Physical" Need: Physicalism and the Via Negativa.Carl Gillett & D. Gene Witmer - 2001 - Analysis 61 (4):302–309.
Citations of this work BETA
Current Physics and 'the Physical'.Agustín Vicente - 2011 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 62 (2):393-416.
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