Philo 13 (2):113-135 (2010)

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Abstract
In reply to the problem of evil, some suggest that God created an infinite number of universes—for example, that God created every universe that contains more good than evil. I offer two objections to these multiverse theodicies. First, I argue that, for any number of universes God creates, he could have created more, because he could have created duplicates of universes. Next, I argue that multiverse theodicies can’t adequately account for why God would create universes with pointless suffering, and hence they don’t solve the problem of evil.
Keywords problem of evil  multiple universes  theodicy  duplicates of universes  Hud Hudson  axiology  hyperspace  infinite utility  principle of identity of indiscernibles  proper classes
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ISBN(s) 1098-3570
DOI 10.5840/philo20101321
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References found in this work BETA

Theism, Possible Worlds, and the Multiverse.Klaas J. Kraay - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 147 (3):355 - 368.
The Many-Universes Solution to the Problem of Evil.Donald Turner - 2003 - In Richard M. Gale & Alexander R. Pruss (eds.), The Existence of God.
The Puzzle of Reality: Why Does the Universe Exist?Derek Parfit - 1992 - In Peter van Inwagen & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), Metaphysics: The Big Questions. Blackwell. pp. 418-427.
A Theodicy.John D. McHarry - 1978 - Analysis 38 (3):132 - 134.

View all 6 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Infinite Value and the Best of All Possible Worlds.Nevin Climenhaga - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (2):367-392.
God Acts in the Quantum World.Bradley Monton - 2014 - In Jonathan L. Kvanvig (ed.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion Volume 5. Oxford University Press.
Megill’s Multiverse Meta-Argument.Klaas J. Kraay - 2013 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 73 (3):235-241.

View all 10 citations / Add more citations

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