Bayesian agnosticism and constructive empiricism

Analysis 58 (3):207–212 (1998)
Abstract
This paper addresses the question: how should the traditional doxastic attitude of agnosticism be represented in a Bayesian framework? Bas van Fraassen has one proposal: a Bayesian is agnostic about a proposition if her opinion about the proposition is represented by a probability interval with zero as the lower limit. I argue that van Fraassen's proposal is not adequate. Mark Kaplan claims that this leads to a problem with constructive empiricism; I show that Kaplan's claim is incorrect
Keywords agnosticism
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DOI 10.1111/1467-8284.00123
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Citations of this work BETA
Suspended Judgment.Jane Friedman - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):165-181.
Minimizing Inaccuracy for Self-Locating Beliefs.Brian Kierland & Bradley Monton - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):384-395.
A Pragmatic Dissolution of Harman's Paradox.Igor Douven - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (2):326-345.

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