Contextualism, relativism and ordinary speakers' judgments

Philosophical Studies 143 (3):341 - 356 (2009)
Some authors have recently claimed that relativism about knowledge sentences accommodates the context sensitivity of our use of such sentences as well as contextualism, while avoiding the counterintuitive consequences of contextualism regarding our inter-contextual judgments, that is, our judgments about knowledge claims made in other contexts. I argue that relativism, like contextualism, involves an error theory regarding a certain class of inter-contextual judgments.
Keywords Relativism  Contextualism  Knowledge  Truth
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References found in this work BETA
John MacFarlane (2007). Relativism and Disagreement. Philosophical Studies 132 (1):17-31.
John MacFarlane (2005). Making Sense of Relative Truth. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (3):321–339.

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Jason Stanley (2016). On a Case for Truth‐Relativism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (1):179-188.

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