Common-sense Realism and the Unimaginable Otherness of Science

Abstract
Bas van Fraassen endorses both common-sense realism — the view, roughly, that the ordinary macroscopic objects that we take to exist actually do exist — and constructive empiricism — the view, roughly, that the aim of science is truth about the observable world. But what happens if common-sense realism and science come into conflict? I argue that it is reasonable to think that they could come into conflict, by giving some motivation for a mental monist solution to the measurement problem of quantum mechanics. I then consider whether, in a situation where science favors the mental monist interpretation, van Fraassen would want to give up common-sense realism or would want to give up science.
Keywords quantum mechanics  mental monism  Bas van Fraassen  constructive empiricism  common-sense realism
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Mctaggart and Modern Physics.Bradley Monton - 2010 - Philosophia 38 (2):257-264.

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