Principia 11 (2):117-126 (2010)
Bas van Fraassen endorses both common - sense realism — the view, roughly, that the ordinary macroscopic objects that we take to exist actually do exist — and constructive empiricism — the view, roughly, that the aim of science is truth about the observable world. But what happens if common - sense realism and science come into conflict? I argue that it is reasonable to think that they could come into conflict, by giving some motivation for a mental monist solution to the measurement problem of quantum mechanics. I then consider whether, in a situation where science favors the mental monist interpretation, van Fraassen would want to give up common - sense realism or would want to give up science. 1. The Potential Tension Bas van Fraassen is a common - sense realist: Constructive empiricism
|Keywords||Mecânica Quântica Monismo Mental Bas van Fraassen|
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