Experimental philosophy and intuitions on what is art and what is not


Authors
Annelies Monseré
University of Ghent
Abstract
It is generally agreed upon that philosophers of art rely on their intuitions to justify or criticize proposed definitions of art. Experimental philosophers, however, have questioned the role of intuition in philosophy, since empirical research shows that philosophers’ intuitions are neither widely shared nor reliable sources of justification. This article aims to apply these experimental challenges to the project of defining art. It will be demonstrated that while experimentalists are right in claiming that philosophers' intuitions cannot be used as epistemic grounds for the definition of art, experimental research itself cannot contribute much to the project of defining art.
Keywords experimental philosophical aesthetics
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Reprint years 2015
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A Defence of Experimental Philosophy in Aesthetics.Clotilde Torregrossa - 2017 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-23.

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