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Abstract
The lesson to be learned from the paradoxical St. Petersburg game and Pascal’s Mugging is that there are situations where expected utility maximizers will needlessly end up poor and on death’s door, and hence we should not be expected utility maximizers. Instead, when it comes to decision-making, for possibilities that have very small probabilities of occurring, we should discount those probabilities down to zero, regardless of the utilities associated with those possibilities.
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Risk and Rationality.Lara Buchak - 2013 - Oxford University Press.
Vexing Expectations.Harris Nover & Alan Hájek - 2004 - Mind 113 (450):237-249.

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