Intuitions without concepts lose the game: mindedness in the art of chess [Book Review]

To gain insight into human nature philosophers often discuss the inferior performance that results from deficits such as blindsight or amnesia. Less often do they look at superior abilities. A notable exception is Herbert Dreyfus who has developed a theory of expertise according to which expert action generally proceeds automatically and unreflectively. We address one of Dreyfus’s primary examples of expertise: chess. At first glance, chess would seem an obvious counterexample to Dreyfus’s view since, clearly, chess experts are engaged in deep strategic thought. However, Dreyfus’s argument is subtle. He accepts that analysis and deliberation play a role in chess, yet he thinks that all such thought is predicated on intuitive, arational expert perception, and action. We argue that even the so-called intuitive aspect of chess is rational through and through.
Keywords Chess  Rationality  Intuition  Skill  Herbert Dreyfus  John McDowell  Mind  Reflection  Deliberation  Action
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DOI 10.1007/s11097-010-9192-9
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References found in this work BETA
The Return of the Myth of the Mental.Hubert L. Dreyfus - 2007 - Inquiry 50 (4):352 – 365.
What Myth?John Mcdowell - 2007 - Inquiry 50 (4):338 – 351.
Overcoming the Myth of the Mental: How Philosophers Can Profit From the Phenomenology of Everyday Expertise.Hubert L. Dreyfus - 2005 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 79 (2):47 - 65.
Response to McDowell.Hubert L. Dreyfus - 2007 - Inquiry 50 (4):371 – 377.

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Citations of this work BETA
Considering the Role of Cognitive Control in Expert Performance.John Toner, Barbara Gail Montero & Aidan Moran - 2015 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (4):1127-1144.
Thinking in the Zone: The Expert Mind in Action.Barbara Gail Montero - 2015 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 53:126-140.
Is Monitoring One’s Actions Causally Relevant to Choking Under Pressure?Barbara Gail Montero - 2015 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (2):379-395.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

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