Knowledge despite falsehood

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (3-4):463-475 (2014)
Abstract
I examine the claim, made by some authors, that we sometimes acquire knowledge from falsehood. I focus on two representative cases in which a subject S infers a proposition q from a false proposition p. If S knows that q, I argue, S's false belief that p is not essential to S's cognition. S's knowledge is instead due to S's belief that p′, a proposition in the neighbourhood of p that S believes . S thus knows despite her false belief. The widely accepted and plausible principle that inferential knowledge requires known premises is unscathed
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DOI 10.1080/00455091.2014.982354
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References found in this work BETA
Epistemology.Richard Feldman - 2006 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 68 (2):429-429.
Counter Closure and Knowledge Despite Falsehood.Brian Ball & Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2014 - Philosophical Quarterly 64 (257):552-568.
Counter-Closure.Federico Luzzi - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (4):673-683.
Knowledge From Falsehood.Ted A. Warfield - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):405–416.

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Citations of this work BETA
Justified Belief From Unjustified Belief.Peter Murphy - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (1).

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