Authors
Barbara Gail Montero
CUNY Graduate Center
Abstract
I am going to argue that it is time to come to terms with the difficulty of understanding what it means to be physical and start thinking about the mind-body problem from a new perspective. Instead of construing it as the problem of finding a place for mentality in a fundamentally physical world, we should think of it as the problem of finding a place for mentality in a fundamentally nonmental world, a world that is at its most fundamental level entirely nonmental. The mind-body problem, I want to argue, is the problem of determining whether mentality can be accounted for in terms of nonmental phenomena. In other words, it is the question, ‘is mentality a fundamental feature of the world’
Keywords Metaphysics  Mind-body  Physicalism  Science  Descartes  Kim, J
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On Characterizing the Physical.Jessica Wilson - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 131 (1):61-99.
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Was Sellars an Error Theorist?Peter Olen & Stephen Turner - 2016 - Synthese 193 (7):2053-2075.

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