Presentism and quantum gravity

In Dennis Dieks (ed.), The Ontology of Spacetime (2006)
Abstract
There is a philosophical tradition of arguing against presentism, the thesis that only presently existing things exist, on the basis of its incompatibility with fundamental physics. I grant that presentism is incompatible with special and general relativity, but argue that presentism is not incompatible with quantum gravity, because there are some theories of quantum gravity that utilize a fixed foliation of spacetime. I reply to various objections to this defense of presentism, and point out a flaw in Gödel's modal argument for the ideality of time. This paper provides an interesting case study of the interplay between physics and philosophy.
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Where in the Relativistic World Are We?Cody Gilmore - 2006 - Philosophical Perspectives 20 (1):199–236.
Feel the Flow.Sam Baron - 2017 - Synthese 194 (2):609-630.
How the Dead Live.Niall Connolly - 2011 - Philosophia 39 (1):83-103.

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