In Dennis Dieks (ed.), The Ontology of Spacetime (2001)

Authors
Bradley Monton
Wuhan University
Abstract
There is a philosophical tradition of arguing against presentism, the thesis that only presently existing things exist, on the basis of its incompatibility with fundamental physics. I grant that presentism is incompatible with special and general relativity, but argue that presentism is not incompatible with quantum gravity, because there are some theories of quantum gravity that utilize a fixed foliation of spacetime. I reply to various objections to this defense of presentism, and point out a flaw in Gödel's modal argument for the ideality of time. This paper provides an interesting case study of the interplay between physics and philosophy.
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References found in this work BETA

Time and Physical Geometry.Hilary Putnam - 1967 - Journal of Philosophy 64 (8):240-247.
The Puzzle of Change.Mark Hinchliff - 1996 - Philosophical Perspectives 10:119-136.
Explaining Science.Ronald Giere - 1991 - Noûs 25 (3):386-388.

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Citations of this work BETA

String Theory, Loop Quantum Gravity and Eternalism.Baptiste Le Bihan - 2020 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 10:17.
Time.Ned Markosian - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Where in the Relativistic World Are We?Cody Gilmore - 2006 - Philosophical Perspectives 20 (1):199–236.

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