Erkenntnis 64 (2):177-191 (2006)

Authors
Barbara Gail Montero
CUNY Graduate Center
Abstract
Might the world be structured, as Leibniz thought, so that every part of matter is divided ad infinitum? The Physicist David Bohm accepted infinitely decomposable matter, and even Steven Weinberg, a staunch supporter of the idea that science is converging on a final theory, admits the possibility of an endless chain of ever more fundamental theories. However, if there is no fundamental level, physicalism, thought of as the view that everything is determined by fundamental phenomena and that all fundamental phenomena are physical, turns out false, for in such a world, there are no fundamental phenoma, and so fundamental phenomena determine nothing. While some take physicalism necessarily to posit a fundamental level, here I present a thesis of physicalism that allows for its truth even in an infinitely decomposable world.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy   Epistemology   Ethics   Logic   Ontology
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Reprint years 2006
DOI 10.1007/s10670-005-1577-8
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References found in this work BETA

Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness.Joseph Levine - 2001 - Oxford University Press USA.
Thinking About Consciousness.David Papineau - 2002 - Oxford University Press UK.
A Physicalist Manifesto: Thoroughly Modern Materialism.Andrew Melnyk - 2003 - New York: Cambridge University Press.

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