Metaphilosophy 38 (1):71–87 (2007)

Abstract
In this article I distinguish a type of justification that is "epistemic" in pertaining to the grounds of one's belief, and "practical" in its connection to what act(s) one may undertake, based on that belief. Such justification, on the proposed account, depends mainly on the proportioning of "inner epistemic virtue" to the "outer risks" implied by one's act. The resulting conception strikes a balance between the unduly moralistic conception of William Clifford and contemporary naturalist virtue theories.
Keywords epistemic virtue  epistemic responsibility  ethics of belief  justification
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9973.2006.00468.x
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References found in this work BETA

An Essay Concerning Human Understanding.John Locke - 1689 - Oxford University Press.
Knowledge in Perspective: Selected Essays in Epistemology.Ernest Sosa - 1991 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions.Keith Derose - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (4):913-929.
Knowledge.Keith Lehrer - 1974 - Clarendon Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Virtue and Voluntarism.James Montmarquet - 2008 - Synthese 161 (3):393 - 402.
The Question of Conscientiousness and Religious Engagement in Public Schools.Ryan Bevan - 2011 - Studies in Philosophy and Education 30 (3):257-269.

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