Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):79–82 (2003)

Authors
Bradley Monton
Wuhan University
Abstract
The Carter-Leslie Doomsday argument, as standardly presented, relies on the assumption that you have knowledge of your approximate birth rank. I demonstrate that the Doomsday argument can still be given in a situation where you have no knowledge of your birth rank. This allows one to reply to Bostrom's defense of the Doomsday argument against the refutation based on the idea that your existence makes it more likely that many observers exist.
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Reprint years 2001, 2003
DOI 10.1111/1467-9213.00297
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References found in this work BETA

The Doomsday Argument and the Number of Possible Observers.Ken D. Olum - 2002 - Philosophical Quarterly 52 (207):164-184.
Doomsday--Or: The Dangers of Statistics.Dennis Dieks - 1992 - Philosophical Quarterly 42 (166):78-84.
The Anthropic Principle and its Implications for Biological Evolution [and Discussion].Brandon Carter & William H. McCrea - 1983 - Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series A, Mathematical and Physical Sciences 310 (1512):347-363.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Quantum Doomsday Argument.Alastair Wilson - 2017 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 68 (2).
How to Predict Future Duration From Present Age.Bradley Monton & Brian Kierland - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (222):16-38.

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