The Doctrinal Paradox, the Discursive Dilemma, and Logical Aggregation theory

Theory and Decision 73 (3):315-355 (2012)
Authors
Philippe Mongin
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Abstract
Judgment aggregation theory, or rather, as we conceive of it here, logical aggregation theory generalizes social choice theory by having the aggregation rule bear on judgments of all kinds instead of merely preference judgments. It derives from Kornhauser and Sager’s doctrinal paradox and List and Pettit’s discursive dilemma, two problems that we distinguish emphatically here. The current theory has developed from the discursive dilemma, rather than the doctrinal paradox, and the final objective of the paper is to give the latter its own theoretical development along the line of recent work by Dietrich and Mongin. However, the paper also aims at reviewing logical aggregation theory as such, and it covers impossibility theorems by Dietrich, Dietrich and List, Dokow and Holzman, List and Pettit, Mongin, Nehring and Puppe, Pauly and van Hees, providing a uniform logical framework in which they can be compared with each other. The review goes through three historical stages: the initial paradox and dilemma, the scattered early results on the independence axiom, and the so-called canonical theorem, a collective achievement that provided the theory with its specific method of analysis. The paper goes some way towards philosophical logic, first by briefly connecting the aggregative framework of judgment with the modern philosophy of judgment, and second by thoroughly discussing and axiomatizing the ‘general logic’ built in this framework
Keywords Judgment aggregation  Logical aggregation  Doctrinal paradox  Discursive dilemma  General logic  Premiss-based vs. conclusion-based approach  Social choice theory  Impossibility theorems
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DOI 10.1007/s11238-012-9310-y
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References found in this work BETA

Counterfactuals.David K. Lewis - 1973 - Blackwell.
Social Choice and Individual Values.Kenneth J. Arrow - 1952 - Science and Society 16 (2):181-181.
A Theory of Conditionals.Robert C. Stalnaker - 1968 - Americal Philosophical Quarterly:98-112.
Logical Constraints on Judgement Aggregation.Marc Pauly & Martin Van Hees - 2006 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 35 (6):569 - 585.

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Citations of this work BETA

Local Supermajorities.Fabrizio Cariani - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (2):391-406.
Judgment Aggregation in Nonmonotonic Logic.Xuefeng Wen - 2018 - Synthese 195 (8):3651-3683.
Judgement Aggregation in Non-Classical Logics.Daniele Porello - 2017 - Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 27 (1-2):106-139.

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Factoring Out the Impossibility of Logical Aggregation.Philippe Mongin - 2008 - Journal of Economic Theory 141:p. 100-113.
The Premiss-Based Approach to Judgment Aggregation.Franz Dietrich & Philippe Mongin - 2010 - Journal of Economic Theory 145 (2):562-582.
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Arrow's Theorem in Judgment Aggregation.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2007 - Social Choice and Welfare 29 (1):19-33.
Changing the Rules of Play.Marc Pauly - 2005 - Topoi 24 (2):209-220.

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