The Given: Experience and its Content

Oxford University Press UK (2016)

Authors
Michelle Montague
University of Texas at Austin
Abstract
What is given to us in conscious experience? The Given is an attempt to answer this question and in this way contribute to a general theory of mental content. The content of conscious experience is understood to be absolutely everything that is given to one, experientially, in the having of an experience. Michelle Montague focuses on the analysis of conscious perception, conscious emotion, and conscious thought, and deploys three fundamental notions in addition to the fundamental notion of content: the notions of intentionality, phenomenology, and consciousness. She argues that all experience essentially involves all four things, and that the key to an adequate general theory of what is given in experience lies in giving a correct specification of the nature of these four things and the relations between them.
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ISBN(s) 9780198748908   0198748906
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Citations of this work BETA

Consciousness and Intentionality.Angela Mendelovici & David Bourget - 2020 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. New York, USA: Oxford University Press. pp. 560-585.
Mental Representation.David Pitt - 2020 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Phenomenal Intentionality.David Bourget & Angela Mendelovici - 2016 - The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Perception and Cognitive Phenomenology.Michelle Montague - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (8):2045-2062.

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