The Role of Intuitions in the Philosophy of Art


Abstract
According to Herman Cappelen and Bernard Molyneux, it is widely assumed that intuitions are used as evidence for philosophical theories in all areas of philosophy. Philosophers’ self-image, however, is wrong. This wrong self-image, so they argue, has merely misled metaphilosophers, but has had no substantial implications for philosophical practices. This article examines the role of intuitions in the project of defining art. In accordance with Cappelen and Molyneux, I demonstrate that philosophers of art believe intuitions are used as evidence for their definitions of art and that this belief is false. In contrast with Cappelen and Molyneux, I maintain that philosophers of art’s false self-image causes substantial damage to their philosophical practice. Firstly, intuitions often are used as persuaders, while, in fact, they do not add philosophical force to the defended position. Secondly, and more importantly, intuition-talk and philosophers’ wrong self-image are partly responsible for the confusi..
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DOI 10.1080/0020174X.2015.1080627
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Experimental Philosophy and Philosophical Intuition.Ernest Sosa - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 132 (1):99-107.
Intuitions, Counter-Examples, and Experimental Philosophy.Max Deutsch - 2010 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (3):447-460.
Intuitions Are Inclinations to Believe.Joshua Earlenbaugh & Bernard Molyneux - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 145 (1):89 - 109.
Intuition.Joel Pust - 2012 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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