Virtue and voluntarism

Synthese 161 (3):393 - 402 (2008)
My aim here is to characterize a certain type of ‘virtue approach’ to questions of responsibility for belief; then to explore the extent to which this is helpful with respect to one fundamental puzzle raised by the claims that we have, and that we do not have, voluntary control over our beliefs; and then ultimately to attempt a more exact statement of doxastic responsibility and, with it a plausible statement of ‘weak doxastic voluntarism.’.
Keywords pistemic virtue  Responsibility for belief  Doxastic voluntarism
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11229-006-9091-3
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 30,727
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - Hutchinson & Co.
Problems of the Self.Bernard A. O. Williams - 1973 - Cambridge University Press.

View all 16 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
The Question of Conscientiousness and Religious Engagement in Public Schools.Ryan Bevan - 2011 - Studies in Philosophy and Education 30 (3):257-269.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Voluntarism and Transparent Deliberation.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2006 - South African Journal of Philosophy 25 (2):171-176.
Doxastic Voluntarism: A Sceptical Defence.Danny Frederick - 2013 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 3 (1):24-44.
Doxastic Voluntarism.Rico Vitz - 2008 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Descartes and the Question of Direct Doxastic Voluntarism.Rico Vitz - 2010 - Journal of Philosophical Research 35:107-21.
Leaps of Knowledge.Andrew Reisner - 2013 - In Timothy Chan (ed.), The Aim of Belief. Oxford University Press. pp. 167-183.
Added to PP index

Total downloads
100 ( #52,814 of 2,197,331 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
4 ( #61,501 of 2,197,331 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature