Value Judgements and Value Neutrality in Economics

Economica 73 (290):257-286 (2006)

Abstract
The paper analyses economic evaluations by distinguishing evaluative statements from actual value judgments. From this basis, it compares four solutions to the value neutrality problem in economics. After rebutting the strong theses about neutrality (normative economics is illegitimate) and non-neutrality (the social sciences are value-impregnated), the paper settles the case between the weak neutrality thesis (common in welfare economics) and a novel, weak non-neutrality thesis that extends the realm of normative economics more widely than the other weak thesis does.
Keywords Value Judgment  Value Neutrality  Normative Economics  Positive Economics  Weber  Robbins
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References found in this work BETA

Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy.Thomas Nagel - 1986 - Journal of Philosophy 83 (6):351-360.
Good and Evil.Peter Geach - 1956 - Analysis 17 (2):33 - 42.

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Citations of this work BETA

Les origines de la distinction entre positif et normatif en économie.Philippe Mongin - 2018 - Revue Philosophique De Louvain 116 (2):151–186.
Philosophy and Economics.D. Wade Hands - 2008 - In S. N. Durlauf & L. E. Blume (eds.), The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd edition. Palgrave. pp. 410-420.
Mark Blaug on the Normativity of Welfare Economics.D. Wade Hands - 2013 - Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics 6 (3):1-25.

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