Grazer Philosophische Studien 94 (3):359-380 (2017)
Abstract_ Source: _Volume 94, Issue 3, pp 359 - 380 In this paper the author discusses and defends a theory of consciousness inspired by Franz Brentano, according to which every conscious experience involves a certain kind of immediate awareness of itself. All conscious experience is in a certain fundamental sense ‘self-intimating’—it constitutively involves awareness of that very awareness. The author calls this ‘the awareness of awareness thesis’, and she calls the phenomenon that it concerns ‘awareness of awareness’. The author attempts to give a substantive description of what AOA consists in in two ways, first, by listing some of its positive features, and second, by comparing it and contrasting it with introspection. The idea is that there are many different ways we can be aware of our experiences, introspection being one way, AOA being another, distinct way. By clarifying the distinction between AOA and introspection, we can get a better grasp of both phenomena.
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References found in this work
Ten Problems of Consciousness: A Representational Theory of the Phenomenal Mind.Michael Tye - 1995 - MIT Press.
Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First-Person Perspective.Dan Zahavi - 2005 - Cambridge MA: Bradford Book/MIT Press.
Citations of this work
Minimal Phenomenal Experience.Thomas Metzinger - 2020 - Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 1 (I):1-44.
On Noticing Transparent States: A Compatibilist Approach to Transparency.Arnaud Dewalque - forthcoming - European Journal of Philosophy.
Attentional Structuring, Subjectivity, and the Ubiquity of Reflexive Inner Awareness.Amit Chaturvedi - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
Self‐Awareness and Self‐Understanding.B. Scot Rousse - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 27 (1):162-186.
Panqualityism, Awareness and the Explanatory Gap.Jakub Mihálik - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (3):1423-1445.
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