What Kind of Awareness is Awareness of Awareness?

Grazer Philosophische Studien 94 (3):359-380 (2017)

Abstract

_ Source: _Volume 94, Issue 3, pp 359 - 380 In this paper the author discusses and defends a theory of consciousness inspired by Franz Brentano, according to which every conscious experience involves a certain kind of immediate awareness of itself. All conscious experience is in a certain fundamental sense ‘self-intimating’—it constitutively involves awareness of that very awareness. The author calls this ‘the awareness of awareness thesis’, and she calls the phenomenon that it concerns ‘awareness of awareness’. The author attempts to give a substantive description of what AOA consists in in two ways, first, by listing some of its positive features, and second, by comparing it and contrasting it with introspection. The idea is that there are many different ways we can be aware of our experiences, introspection being one way, AOA being another, distinct way. By clarifying the distinction between AOA and introspection, we can get a better grasp of both phenomena.

Download options

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 72,805

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2017-09-12

Downloads
154 (#78,380)

6 months
10 (#73,930)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Michelle Montague
University of Texas at Austin

Citations of this work

Minimal Phenomenal Experience.Thomas Metzinger - 2020 - Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 1 (I):1-44.
Attentional Structuring, Subjectivity, and the Ubiquity of Reflexive Inner Awareness.Amit Chaturvedi - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
Self‐Awareness and Self‐Understanding.B. Scot Rousse - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 27 (1):162-186.

View all 12 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

I = Awareness.A. Delkman - 1996 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (4):350-356.
Self-Intimation.Galen Strawson - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (1):1-31.
Inner Time-Consciousness and Pre-Reflective Self-Awareness.Dan Zahavi - 2003 - In Donn Welton (ed.), The New Husserl: A Critical Reader. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. pp. 157-180.
Space and Self-Awareness.John Louis Schwenkler - 2009 - Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley
A Direct Realist Account of Perceptual Awareness.Michael Huemer - 1998 - Dissertation, Rutgers University
Review: Précis of "Knowledge and Its Limits". [REVIEW]Timothy Williamson - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):431 - 435.
Knowledge and Awareness.Clayton Littlejohn - 2015 - Analysis 75 (4):596-603.