A new puzzle about belief and credence
Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (2):272-291 (2019)
Abstract
I present a puzzle about belief and credence, which takes the form of three independently supported views that are mutually inconsistent. The first is the view thatShas a modal belief thatp if and only ifShas a corresponding credence thatp. The second is the view thatSbelieves thatponly ifShas some credence thatp. The third is the view that, possibly,Sbelieves thatpwithout a modal belief thatp. [Word Count: 85]Author's Profile
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2018
DOI
10.1080/00455091.2018.1503028
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Citations of this work
The Relationship Between Belief and Credence.Elizabeth G. Jackson - 2020 - Philosophy Compass 15 (6):1–13.
Belief and Credence: Why the Attitude-Type Matters.Elizabeth Jackson - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2477-2496.
Credence: A Belief-First Approach.Andrew Moon & Elizabeth Jackson - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (5):652–669.
Why Credences Are Not Beliefs.Elizabeth Jackson - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (2):360-370.
Dilemmas, Disagreement, and Dualism.Elizabeth Jackson - 2021 - In Scott Stapleford, Kevin McCain & Matthias Steup (eds.), Epistemic Dilemmas: New Arguments, New Angles. New York, USA: Routledge. pp. 217–231.
References found in this work
Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind.Jerry A. Fodor - 1987 - MIT Press.
Knowledge in an Uncertain World.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2009 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.