A nonreductive physicalist libertarian free will

Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming)
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Abstract

Libertarian free will is, roughly, the view that the same agential states can cause different possible actions. Nonreductive physicalism is, roughly, the view that mental states cause actions to occur, while these actions also have sufficient physical causes. Though libertarian free will and nonreductive physicalism have overlapping subject matter, and while libertarian free will is currently trending at the same time as nonreductive physicalism is a dominant metaphysical posture, there are few sustained expositions of a nonreductive physicalist model of libertarian free will – indeed some tell against such an admixture. This paper concocts such a blend by articulating and defending, with some caveats, a nonreductive physicalist model of libertarian free will.

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Dwayne Moore
University of Saskatchewan

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References found in this work

Special sciences.Jerry A. Fodor - 1974 - Synthese 28 (2):97-115.
Mental causation.Stephen Yablo - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (2):245-280.
Why Free Will is Real.Christian List - 2019 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard University Press.
Physicalism, or Something near Enough.Jaegwon Kim - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (223):306-310.

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