Counterfactuals, Autonomy and Downward Causation: Reply to Zhong

Philosophia 41 (3):831-839 (2013)
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Abstract

In recent papers, Lei Zhong argues that the autonomy solution to the causal exclusion problem is unavailable to anyone that endorses the counterfactual model of causation. The linchpin of his argument is that the counterfactual theory entails the downward causation principle, which conflicts with the autonomy solution. In this note I argue that the counterfactual theory does not entail the downward causation principle, so it is possible to advocate for the autonomy solution to the causal exclusion problem from within the counterfactual theory of causation

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Dwayne Moore
University of Saskatchewan

References found in this work

Physicalism, or Something Near Enough.Jaegwon Kim - 2005 - Princeton University Press.
Mental causation.Stephen Yablo - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (2):245-280.
Causation as influence.David Lewis - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (4):182-197.
Causation.D. Lewis - 1973 - In Philosophical Papers Ii. Oxford University Press. pp. 159-213.

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