Divine Intentions and the Problem of Evil

Religious Studies 55 (2):215-234 (2019)
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Abstract

I develop a model of providence on which God brings about good states of affairs by means of evil states of affairs, but without intending the latter. The model's key ingredient is a backward-looking counterpart of the distinction between intended and merely foreseen consequences of an action: namely, a distinction between intended and merely foreseen means to an end. The model enables greater-good theodicies to avoid worries about whether a perfect being could intend evil.

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2023-07-15

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Justin Mooney
College of the Holy Cross

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References found in this work

The Nature of Necessity.Alvin Plantinga - 1974 - Oxford, England: Clarendon Press.
Providence and the Problem of Evil.Richard Swinburne - 1998 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
The metaphysics of hyperspace.Hud Hudson - 2005 - New York: Oxford University Press.

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