How to Use Cognitive Faculties You Never Knew You Had

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (S1):251-275 (2018)
Abstract
Norman forms the belief that the president is in New York by way of a clairvoyance faculty he doesn’t know he has. Many agree that his belief is unjustified but disagree about why it is unjustified. I argue that the lack of justification cannot be explained by a higher-level evidence requirement on justification, but it can be explained by a no-defeater requirement. I then explain how you can use cognitive faculties you don’t know you have. Lastly, I use lessons from the foregoing to compare Norman’s belief, formed by clairvoyance, with Sally’s theistic belief, formed by a sensus divinitatis.
Keywords epistemic justification  higher-level evidence  defeaters  proper functionalism  religious epistemology  social epistemology
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Reprint years 2018
DOI 10.1111/papq.12234
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References found in this work BETA
Warrant and Proper Function.Alvin Plantinga - 1993 - Oxford University Press.
Epistemology and Cognition.Alvin I. Goldman - 1986 - Harvard University Press.
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.

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