Is the feeling of unity that Kant identifies in his third critique a type of inexpressible knowledge?

Philosophy 82 (3):475-485 (2007)
Abstract
Kant, in his third Critique, confronts the issue of how rule-governed objective judgement is possible. He argues that it requires a particular kind of aesthetic response to one's experience. I dub this response 'the Feeling of Unity', and I raise the question whether it is a type of inexpressible knowledge. Using David Bell's account of these matters as a touchstone, I argue that it is
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1017/S003181910700006X
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 30,300
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Constituting the Mind: Kant, Davidson, and the Unity of Consciousness.Jeff Malpas - 1999 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 7 (1):1-30.
Hegel's Critique of Kant.Robert R. Williams - 2006 - The Owl of Minerva 38 (1/2):9-34.
The Unity of Reason: Rereading Kant.Susan Neiman - 1994 - Oxford University Press.
Kant's Account of Nature's Systematicity and the Unity of Theoretical and Practical Reason.Lara Ostaric - 2009 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 52 (2):155 – 178.
Kant, Skepticism, and Moral Sensibility.Owen Ware - 2010 - Dissertation, University of Toronto
Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime.Immanuel Kant - 1960 - Berkeley: University of California Press.
Inexpressible Truths and the Allure of the Knowledge Argument.Benj Hellie - 2004 - In Yujin Nagasawa, Peter Ludlow & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), There's Something About Mary. MIT Press. pp. 333.
Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
28 ( #187,884 of 2,193,222 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #290,278 of 2,193,222 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature