Knowing Without Evidence

Mind 121 (482):309-331 (2012)
Abstract
In this paper, I present counterexamples to the evidence thesis, the thesis that S knows that p at t only if S believes that p on the basis of evidence at t. The outline of my paper is as follows. In section 1, I explain the evidence thesis and make clear what a successful counterexample to the evidence thesis will look like. In section 2, I show that instances of non-occurrent knowledge are counterexamples to the evidence thesis. At the end of section 2, I consider the primary thesis of my paper — that the evidence thesis is false — to be successfully defended. In section 3, I consider three variations of the evidence thesis. The first variation restricts the evidence thesis to occurrent knowledge; the second requires for knowledge that one’s belief could be based on evidence; and the third requires for knowledge that the belief was based on evidence at a suitable prior time. The secondary thesis of this paper is that these variations are also subject to serious objections
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DOI 10.1093/mind/fzs048
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References found in this work BETA
Philosophical Explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Harvard University Press.
Epistemology and Cognition.Alvin I. Goldman - 1986 - Harvard University Press.
Warrant and Proper Function.Alvin Plantinga - 1993 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
Remembering Entails Knowing.Andrew Moon - 2013 - Synthese 190 (14):2717-2729.
Memory, Epistemology Of.Matthew Frise - 2015 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Skepticism and Memory.Andrew Moon - 2017 - In Sven Bernecker & Kourken Michaelian (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory. Routledge.
Memory.Kourken Michaelian & John Sutton - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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