Physical-Effect Epiphenomenalism and Common Underlying Causes

Dialogue 51 (3):397-418 (2012)

Authors
Dwayne Moore
University of Saskatchewan
Abstract
Qualia epiphenomenalism is the view that qualitative properties of events, such as the raw feel of tastes or painfulness, lack causal efficacy. One common objection to qualia epiphenomenalism is the epistemic argument, which states that this loss of causal efficacy undermines our capacity to know about these epiphenomenal qualitative properties. A number of rejoinders have been offered up to insulate qualia epiphenomenalism from the epistemic argument. In this paper I consider and ultimately reject two such replies, namely, the common underlying cause reply and the appeal to physical-effect epiphenomenalism. View HTML Send article to KindleTo send this article to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply. Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.Physical-Effect Epiphenomenalism and Common Underlying CausesVolume 51, Issue 3DWAYNE MOORE DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0012217312000674Your Kindle email address Please provide your Kindle email.@free.kindle.com@kindle.com Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Dropbox To send this article to your Dropbox account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Dropbox. Physical-Effect Epiphenomenalism and Common Underlying CausesVolume 51, Issue 3DWAYNE MOORE DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0012217312000674Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Google Drive To send this article to your Google Drive account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Google Drive. Physical-Effect Epiphenomenalism and Common Underlying CausesVolume 51, Issue 3DWAYNE MOORE DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0012217312000674Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Export citation Request permission.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1017/s0012217312000674
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Translate to english
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 46,355
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning In the Philosophy of Mind.Jay L. Garfield - 1987 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (1):235-240.
Physicalism, or Something Near Enough.Jaegwon Kim - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (223):306-310.
Consciousness Explained.William G. Lycan - 1993 - Philosophical Review 102 (3):424.
The Rediscovery of the Mind by John Searle. [REVIEW]Daniel C. Dennett - 1993 - Journal of Philosophy 90 (4):193-205.
Explaining Behaviour: Reasons in a World of Causes.Andy Clark - 1988 - Philosophical Quarterly 40 (158):95-102.

View all 40 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

On Robinson’s Response to the Self-Stultifying Objection.Dwayne Moore - 2012 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (4):627-641.
In Defence of Qualia-Epiphenomenalism.Volker Gadenne - 2006 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (1-2):101-114.
Semifactuals and Epiphenomenalism.Danilo Suster - 2001 - Acta Analytica 16 (26):23-43.
More Troubles for Epiphenomenalism.Hans Muller - 2008 - Philosophia 37 (1):109-112.
Supervenient Qualia.Terence Horgan - 1987 - Philosophical Review 96 (October):491-520.
Epistemological Challenges to Qualia-Epiphenomenalism.Alexander Staudacher - 2006 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (1-2):153-175.
Is There a Problem in Physicalist Epiphenomenalism?Amir Horowitz - 1999 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (2):421-34.
Epiphenomenal Qualia.Frank Jackson - 1982 - Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.
Explanatory Epiphenomenalism.Neil Campbell - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (220):437-451.
Epiphenomenalism.Keith Campbell & Nicholas J. J. Smith - 1993 - Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2012-10-01

Total views
56 ( #157,516 of 2,286,123 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
4 ( #318,928 of 2,286,123 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature