Philosophy and Rhetoric 43 (4):383 (2010)

Abstract
Chaïm Perelman resuscitated the rhetorical tradition by developing an elegant and detailed theory of argumentation. Rejecting the single-minded Cartesian focus on rational truth, Perelman recovered the ancient wisdom that we can argue reasonably about matters that admit only of probability. From this one would conclude that Perelman's argumentation theory is inalterably opposed to natural law, and therefore that I would have done better to have written an article titled "Perelman's Theory of Argumentation as a Rejection of Natural Law."However, my thesis is precisely that Perelman's theory of argumentation connects to the natural law tradition in interesting and productive ways. Perelman referred to natural law in.
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DOI 10.5325/philrhet.43.4.0383
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References found in this work BETA

The Concept of Law.Hla Hart - 1961 - Oxford University Press.
The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation.Chaïm Perelman - 1969 - Notre Dame, [Ind.]University of Notre Dame Press.
The Concept of Law.Hla Hart - 1961 - Oxford University Press UK.
The Concept of Law.Stuart M. Brown - 1963 - Philosophical Review 72 (2):250.

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Citations of this work BETA

Person and Disability: Legal Fiction and Living Independently.Paolo Heritier - forthcoming - International Journal for the Semiotics of Law - Revue Internationale de Sémiotique Juridique:1-18.
Legal Audiences.Fábio Perin Shecaira & Noel Struchiner - 2018 - Argumentation 32 (2):273-291.

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