The possibility of resurrection by reassembly

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 84 (3):273-288 (2018)
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It is widely held that the classic reassembly model of resurrection faces intractable problems. What happens to someone if God assembles two individuals at the resurrection which are equally good candidates for being the original person? If two or more people, such as a cannibal and the cannibal’s victim, were composed of the same particles at their respective deaths, can they both be resurrected? If they can, who gets the shared particles? And would an attempt to reassemble a long-gone individual result in a genuine resurrection, or merely an intrinsic duplicate of the original person? In this paper, I argue that the first of these problems has, in effect, been solved by defenders of a rival view; I propose a novel solution to the second problem; and I show that the third can be solved by upgrading the naïve reassembly model to a novel variety of reassembly model.

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Justin Mooney
College of the Holy Cross

Citations of this work

Multilocation Without Time Travel.Justin Mooney - 2021 - Erkenntnis 86 (6):1431-1444.
The inexorability of immortality: no need for God?Anna Smajdor - 2021 - Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift 56 (1):19-30.

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The Paradoxes of Time Travel.David K. Lewis - 1976 - American Philosophical Quarterly 13 (2):145-152.
Material Beings.Peter Van Inwagen - 1990 - Philosophy 67 (259):126-127.
A Materialist Metaphysics of the Human Person.Hud Hudson - 2001 - Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

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