Warrant Does Entail Truth

Synthese 184 (3):287-297 (2012)
Authors
Andrew Moon
Virginia Commonwealth University
Abstract
Let ‘warrant’ denote whatever precisely it is that makes the difference between knowledge and mere true belief. A current debate in epistemology asks whether warrant entails truth, i.e., whether (Infallibilism) S’s belief that p is warranted only if p is true. The arguments for infallibilism have come under considerable and, as of yet, unanswered objections. In this paper, I will defend infallibilism. In Part I, I advance a new argument for infallibilism; the basic outline is as follows. Suppose fallibilism is true. An implication of fallibilism is that the property that makes the difference between knowledge and mere belief (which I dub ‘warrant*’) is the conjunctive property being warranted and true . I show that this implication of fallibilism conflicts with an uncontroversial thesis we have learned from reflection on Gettier cases: that nonaccidental truth is a constituent of warrant*. It follows that infallibilism is true. In the second part of the paper, I present and criticize a new argument against infallibilism. The argument states that there are plausible cases where, intuitively, the only thing that is keeping a belief from counting as knowledge is the falsity of that belief. Furthermore, it is plausible that such a belief is warranted and false. So, the argument goes, infallibilism is false. I show that this argument fails.
Keywords Warrant  Infallibilism  Knowledge  Gettier
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11229-010-9815-2
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2005 - Oxford University Press UK.
Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?Edmund Gettier - 1963 - Analysis 23 (6):121-123.
Warrant: The Current Debate.Alvin Plantinga - 1993 - Oxford University Press.
The Inescapability of Gettier Problems.Linda Zagzebski - 1994 - Philosophical Quarterly 44 (174):65-73.
Infallibilism and Gettier's Legacy.Daniel Howard-Snyder - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):304 - 327.

View all 17 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

How to Be an Infallibilist.Julien Dutant - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):148-171.
Bifurcated Sceptical Invariantism.Christos Kyriacou - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Research 42:27-44.

View all 7 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Infallibilism and Gettier's Legacy.Daniel Howard-Snyder - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):304 - 327.
More on Warrant's Entailing Truth.Trenton Merricks - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (3):627-631.
Warrant and Analysis.Joel Pust - 2000 - Analysis 60 (1):51–57.
Warrant is Unique.Andrew M. Bailey - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 149 (3):297-304.
Against Fallibilism.Dylan Dodd - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (4):665 - 685.
Justified Vs. Warranted Perceptual Belief: Resisting Disjunctivism.Juan Comesaña - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2):367-383.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2012-01-03

Total downloads
207 ( #24,762 of 2,268,371 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
32 ( #11,994 of 2,268,371 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature