Anything is possible

Erkenntnis 30 (3):319 - 337 (1989)
Abstract
This paper criticises necessitarianism, the thesis that there is at least one necessary truth; and defends possibilism, the thesis that all propositions are contingent, or that anything is possible. The second section maintains that no good conventionalist account of necessity is available, while the third section criticises model theoretic necessitarianism. The fourth section sketches some recent technical work on nonclassical logic, with the aim of weakening necessitarian intuitions and strengthening possibilist intuitions. The fifth section considers several a prioristic attempts at demonstrating that there is at least one necessary proposition and finds them inadequate. The final section emphasises the epistemic aspect of possibilism.
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DOI 10.1007/BF00168284
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References found in this work BETA
Word and Object.W. V. Quine - 1960 - MIT Press.
Conjectures and Refutations.K. R. Popper - 1966 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 21 (3):431-434.
Universals and Scientific Realism.D. M. Armstrong - 1978 - Cambridge University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
Variation on a Trivialist Argument of Paul Kabay.Lloyd Humberstone - 2011 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 20 (1):115-132.
Deviant Logic and the Paradoxes of Self Reference.Greg Restall - 1993 - Philosophical Studies 70 (3):279 - 303.
Belief in Absolute Necessity.John Divers & José Edgar González‐Varela - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (2):358-391.

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