A thick realist consequence of Wright's minimalism

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (1):24–38 (2007)
According to Wrights minimalism, a notion of truth neutral with respect to realism and antirealism can be built out of the notion of warranted assertibility and a set of a priori platitudes among which the Equivalence Schema has a prominent role. Wright believes that the debate about realism and antirealism will be properly and fruitfully developed if both parties accept the conceptual framework of minimalism. In this paper, I show that this conceptual framework commits the minimalist to the realist thesis that there are mind-independent propositions; with the consequence that minimalism is not neutral to realism and antirealism. I suggest that Wright could avert this conclusion if he rejected the customary interpretation of the Equivalence Schema according to which this Schema applies to propositions. This would however render minimalism unpalatable to philosophers who welcome the traditional reading of the Equivalence Schema and believe that propositions are bearers of truth.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2007.00279.x
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Truth and Objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Harvard University Press.
Platonism for Cheap? Crispin Wright on Frege's Context Principle.Hartry Field - 1984 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 14:637--62.

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