Beyond interpretation: Reply to Cummins' response [Book Review]
Minds and Machines 2 (1):85-95 (1992)
In his response to my Why There Are No Mental Representations, Robert Cummins accused me of having misinterpreted his views, and attempted to undermine a crucial premise of my argument, which claimed that one could only define a semantic type non-semantically by stipulating which tokens should receive a uniform interpretation. I respond to the charge and defend the premise
|Keywords||Mental representation formal condition determinate content intentionality interpretation cognition|
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