Craig on the actual infinite

Religious Studies 38 (2):147-166 (2002)

Abstract
In a series of much discussed articles and books, William Lane Craig defends the view that the past could not consist in a beginningless series of events. In the present paper, I cast a critical eye on just one part of Craig's case for the finitude of the past – viz. his philosophical argument against the possibility of actually infinite sets of objects in the ‘real world’. I shall try to show that this argument is unsuccessful. I shall also take a close look at several considerations that are often thought to favour the possibility of an actual infinite, arguing in each case that Craig's response is inadequate.
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DOI 10.1017/s0034412502005978
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Finitism and the Beginning of the Universe.Stephen Puryear - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (4):619-629.
Heartbreak at Hilbert's Hotel.Landon Hedrick - 2014 - Religious Studies 50 (1):27-46.
Finitism and Divisibility: A Reply to Puryear.Travis Dumsday - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (3):596-601.

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