Journal of Philosophical Logic 24 (5):455-467 (1995)

Edwin Mares
Victoria University of Wellington
We show that the implicational fragment of intuitionism is the weakest logic with a non-trivial probabilistic semantics which satisfies the thesis that the probabilities of conditionals are conditional probabilities. We also show that several logics between intuitionism and classical logic also admit non-trivial probability functions which satisfy that thesis. On the other hand, we also prove that very weak assumptions concerning negation added to the core probability conditions with the restriction that probabilities of conditionals are conditional probabilities are sufficient to trivialize the semantics
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DOI 10.1007/bf01052599
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References found in this work BETA

The Logic of Conditionals.Ernest Adams, Ernest W. Adams, Jaakko Hintikka & Patrick Suppes - 1974 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 39 (3):609-611.
Probability and Conditionals.Robert C. Stalnaker - 1970 - Philosophy of Science 37 (1):64-80.

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Citations of this work BETA

Bruno de Finetti and the Logic of Conditional Events.Peter Milne - 1997 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (2):195-232.
Conditionals.R. A. Briggs - 2019 - In Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg (eds.), The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology. PhilPapers Foundation. pp. 543-590.
From Classical to Intuitionistic Probability.Brian Weatherson - 2003 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 44 (2):111-123.
Inference to the Best Contradiction?Sam Baron - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.

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