Conditionals, probability, and nontriviality

Journal of Philosophical Logic 24 (5):455-467 (1995)
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We show that the implicational fragment of intuitionism is the weakest logic with a non-trivial probabilistic semantics which satisfies the thesis that the probabilities of conditionals are conditional probabilities. We also show that several logics between intuitionism and classical logic also admit non-trivial probability functions which satisfy that thesis. On the other hand, we also prove that very weak assumptions concerning negation added to the core probability conditions with the restriction that probabilities of conditionals are conditional probabilities are sufficient to trivialize the semantics



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Edwin Mares
Victoria University of Wellington

Citations of this work

Bruno de finetti and the logic of conditional events.Peter Milne - 1997 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (2):195-232.
From Classical to Intuitionistic Probability.Brian Weatherson - 2003 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 44 (2):111-123.
Conditionals.R. A. Briggs - 2019 - In Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg (eds.), The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology. PhilPapers Foundation. pp. 543-590.
The nature of nonmonotonic reasoning.Charles G. Morgan - 2000 - Minds and Machines 10 (3):321-360.

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